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In re Minter-Higgins
Deanna Scorzelli, J.D. Candidate 2010

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether a Chapter 7 trustee can utilize a turnover motion to recover from a debtor funds
that were transferred from the debtor’s bank account post-petition as a result of the debtor
issuing checks and initiating debit transfers before filing for bankruptcy that were not honored by
the bank until after she filed the petition?

BRIEF ANSWERS
A Chapter 7 trustee cannot recover from the debtor, through a turnover motion, postpetition transfers that were made out of the debtor’s bank account that resulted from pre-petition
checks and debit expenditures that were not transferred by the bank to the payees until after the
debtor filed for bankruptcy. The § 362(b)(11) exception from the automatic stay insulates a
consumer debtor from the trustee’s attempt to require her to “turnover” these amounts.

DISCUSSION
In 1984, § 362(b)(11) was added to the United States Code. Roete v. Smith, 936 F.2d 963,
966 (7th Cir. 1991). This section was intended by Congress to create an exception to the
automatic stay produced by § 362(a). Id. The statute says that “[t]he filing of a petition . . . does
not operate as a stay . . . under subsection (a) of this section, of the presentment of a negotiable
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instrument and the giving of notice of and protesting dishonor of such an instrument.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(b)(11) (2006). The House Judiciary Committee stated that “the automatic stay is not
intended to interfere with the rights of a holder of a negotiable instrument to obtain payment.”
H.R. REP. NO. 96-1195 (1980); see Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. American Sav.
and Loan Ass’n, 804 F.2d 1487, 1492 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Roete, 936 F.2d at 966. Even
prior to this clarification by Congress, it was stated “that presentment of a negotiable instrument
subsequent to the filing of a bankruptcy petition did not violate” the automatic stay. See Morgan,
804 F.2d at 1492; see also In re Minter-Higgins, 366 B.R. 880, 887 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2007).
Nevertheless, courts that have analyzed the issue of whether the debtor must turnover
funds that were taken out of his bank account as a result of post-petition presentment have
reached inconsistent and conflicting conclusions. For example, in In re Pyatt, the court denied
the Trustee’s motion to compel turnover. In re Pyatt, 348 B.R. 783, (8th Cir. Bankr. App. Panel
2006). The court found that the debtor failed to report the actual amount in his bank account on
the date of petition, which was one of his required duties. Id. at 785. Yet, the court ruled in favor
of the debtor for three reasons. First, the court explained that the trustee could prevent transfers
without having to face criminal liability. Id. at 786. The debtor, on the other hand, would risk
prosecution for “writing a bad check.” Id. Second, the trustee is the only party authorized to
recover post-petition transfers. Id. Third, considerations of “fundamental fairness” require that
the funds be collected from the creditors who received the transfers rather than from the debtor.
Id.
The court came to a similar conclusion in In re Taylor, 332 B.R. 609 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
2005). Again, the debtor issued checks pre-petition that were not honored by the bank until after
the debtor filed for bankruptcy. The trustee sought a turnover of the property which was in the
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debtor’s account when she filed her bankruptcy petition, which included the money used to pay
the pre-petition transferees. The court “adopt[ed] the date of honoring rather than the date of
delivery for purposes of determining the effective date of a transfer made by a check.” Id. at 611.
Therefore, the amount of the pre-petition checks that were not honored by the bank until after the
debtor filed the petition “were property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate on the date of filing.”
Id. Nevertheless, the court held that the trustee could not compel turnover of the funds from the
debtor. The court reasoned that upon the filing of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, it is the
responsibility of the trustee to “give the notices necessary to ensure that property of the estate is
paid to the trustee.” Id. at 612. Therefore, as long as the debtor made the proper disclosures on
her petition, “the Trustee then had the responsibility to either notify the identified bank of the
bankruptcy filing so that the bank no longer had the ability to honor outstanding checks postpetition, or to issue a stop payment on any outstanding checks.” Id. at 613.
The court reached a contrary decision in In re Dybalski. In re Dybalski, 316 B.R. 312
(Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2004). There the petitioner’s bank honored several checks that were issued by
the debtor prior to filing for bankruptcy. The court stated that since the “[t]ransfers from the
debtor’s checking account occurred post-petition, the transferred [f]unds are, therefore, property
of the estate.” Id. at 316. The court acknowledges that this has the effect of making the debtor
“pay the same ‘bill’ twice,” but the court reasons that the result is fair because it is the debtor
who has the responsibility of making sure that any checks he has issued are honored by the bank
before he files for bankruptcy. Id. at 316–317.
Similarly, in In re Sawyer, 324 B.R. 115 (Bankr. Ariz. 2005), the court again faced the
situation where a debtor wrote out checks pre-petition, which were not honored by the financial
institution until post-petition. The court ruled in favor of the Chapter 7 trustee and ordered
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turnover of the funds. In reaching its decision, the court first reasoned that 11 U.S.C. §
362(b)(11) applies “only to those third parties which engage in transactions with the debtor.” Id.
at 121. The court explains, for example, that if a bank does not have knowledge that the debtor
filed for bankruptcy, and subsequently transferred property of the estate, as long as the transfer
was made in good faith, the bank will be protected. Id. The court then stated that under 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(a), the funds were property of the bankruptcy estate. Id. The court also found that,
although the debtor did not have custody of the funds, she did have control over the funds
because the bank “had not authorized, as a payor bank, any final payment on the checks that the
Debtors had sent out by mail.” Id. Based on this reasoning, the court found that the debtor was
required to turn over the funds. Although the court expressed discontent with this outcome, it
maintained the result and suggested that the debtor could avoid this consequence by using her
debit card rather than issuing checks. Id. at 124 (explaining that “it concerns this Court that this
Decision now requires a debtor in Arizona to wait until all checks have been honored . . . before
filing a petition . . . [but] the Court sees not alternative to such a requirement.”).
Another United State Bankruptcy Court was recently faced with the same issue in In re
Minter-Higgins. 366 B.R. 880 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2007). The court, in Minter-Higgins, rejected
the reasoning of the cases above in holding that the debtor was not required to turnover the
funds. Id. at 887.
I.

Factual and Procedural History of In re Minter Higgins
The amount in dispute in In re Minter Higgins, $383.13, was a rather insubstantial

amount, however, the conclusive settlement of the question posed to the court could have a
substantial effect on the rights and obligations of both parties to a bankruptcy proceeding. Prior
to filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the debtor used checks and debit transfers to make $383.13
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worth of expenditures. This money was used to pay for groceries, and gasoline. The debtor also
made a credit card payment with the money and a donation to her church. The court classified
these as “ordinary transactions.” In re Minter-Higgins, 366 B.R. 880, 886 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.
2007). Due to regular delay, however, the funds to pay for these expenditures “were not
transferred to the payees of those checks until after the date of the filing of the petition.” Id. at
882–883. Consequently, it was unclear whether those funds should be considered part of the
debtor’s estate.
The Chapter 7 trustee made a motion to have the debtor turnover the funds that were held
in her bank account when she filed her bankruptcy petition. A hearing was held on the motion, at
which time the debtor objected to the turnover. The court denied the trustee’s motion. On
November 22, 2006, the Chapter 7 trustee filed a motion to alter or amend the prior judgment.
II.

The Argument of the Chapter 7 Trustee
The Chapter 7 trustee argued that all the “funds on deposit in the debtor’s account on the

date of her filing her petition constituted property of the debtor’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate.”
In re Minter-Higgins, 366 B.R. 880, 882 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2007). Relying on In re USA
Diversified Products, Inc., 100 F.3d 53 (7th Cir. 1996), the trustee further alleges that all the
“outstanding checks or debit requests [that] were not transferred to the payees of those checks
until after the date of the filing of the petition . . . [remain] property of the debtor’s Chapter 7
estate [and are thus] subject to turnover by the debtor.” Minter-Higgins, 366 B.R. at 882–883.
Furthermore, the trustee argued that under 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) he could “require delivery of
‘property or the value of such property’.” Id. at 884. Therefore, he claims that he can “obtain the
value of transferred property even if the target of the turnover order is no longer in possession of
that property.” Id.
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III.

The Debtor’s Argument
Alternatively, the debtor argued that because the check and debit expenditures “were

outstanding and ha[d] not yet been finally charged to her account on the date of the filing of her
petition, the amount of her …[account] on the date of the filing of her petition should be
diminished by these items.” In re Minter-Higgins, 366 B.R. 880, 882 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2007).
Consequently, the debtor argues that the Trustee’s turn over motion should be denied.
IV.

The Court’s Ruling
The court rejected the reasoning of both parties and ultimately resorted to the concept of

fundamental fairness in reaching its decision that the debtor should not be required to turnover
the funds. Initially, the court considered whether the trustee could recover from the bank or from
the transferees of the negotiable instruments. In both instances, the court reasoned that this would
not be possible.
It is conceivable that the trustee could have sought turnover from the bank since 11
U.S.C. § 542(b) provides that “an entity that owes a debt that is property of the estate and that is
matured, payable on demand, or payable on order, shall pay such debt to… the trustee.” The
court held, however, that it was proper for the trustee not to seek recovery from the bank. In re
Minter-Higgins, 366 B.R. 880, 883 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2007) The court said that 11 U.S.C. §
542(c) insulated the bank since “there is no evidence that that entity had either actual notice or
actual knowledge of the commencement of the debtor’s case.” Id. Where a financial institution
does not have knowledge of the commencement of the case, it will not be liable if it “transfer[s]
property of the estate, or pays a debt owing to the debtor, in good faith.” 11 U.S.C. § 542(b)
(1994); Minter-Higgins, 336 B.R. at 883.
The court also found that the trustee would not be able to recover from the payees of the
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check and debit expenditures. Id. The trustee could not utilize preference recovery under 11
U.S.C. § 547(b) because “that section requires the transfer to be made on the date of the filing of
the petition or within a specified period prior to that date.” Id. Since the transfers in this case did
not occur until after the debtor filed her petition, the trustee cannot utilize preference recovery.
Similarly, the trustee would fail to recover from the payees under 11 U.S.C. § 549(a).
This section provides that “the trustee may avoid a transfer of property of the estate- (1) that
occurs after the commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 549(a) (1994); Minter-Higgins, 366
B.R. at 883. Nevertheless the court stated that “11 U.S.C. § 349(a)(2)(b) precludes recovery of
post petition transactions if they are authorized by either Title 11 of the United States Code or by
the Court.” Id. Here, the transaction was authorized by 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(11), which excepted
the presentment of the negotiable instruments from the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(11)
states that “‘the presentment of a negotiable instrument and the giving of notice of and protesting
dishonor of such an instrument’ do not violate the automatic stay.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(11)
(2006); Minter-Higgins, 366 B.R. at 883. Therefore, the trustee could not recover the money
from the transferees.
Thus, the trustee was limited to seeking recovery from the debtor who was no longer in
possession of the transferred funds. First the court had to determine whether the funds in
question were part of the debtor’s estate. The court, under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a), adopted an
extremely broad understanding of what constitutes the debtor’s estate. Essentially “all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case,” are considered
part of the estate. Id. at 885. The court strictly applied the statute, and therefore found that
because the $383.13 was in the debtor’s account at the time the proceeding was commenced, it
was considered property of the estate. Id.
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While the funds were considered part of the debtor’s estate, the court determined that
they were not recoverable from the debtor. The courts determination was based on the principle
of fundamental fairness. The court bases its unfairness rational on four grounds.
First, the court explains that there is “an inherent unfairness… in having the debtor pay
back something to the trustee that the trustee can’t recover from transferees.” Minter-Higgins,
366 B.R. at 887. The court considered the fact that in nearly every other case, the trustee tries to
recover from the transferee, rather than the debtor. Id. at 885. The reason that recovery is sought
from the transferee is so that the debtor does not end up having to pay twice. Here, the trustee is
seeking recovery from the debtor since he cannot recover from the payees. The court said that
the law is not so “unfair” that it would allow such recovery. Id. at 886.
Second, the debtor cannot control the presentment of a check. Id. at 887. It would be
unfair to hold the debtor liable for delays by the bank where the debtor would not be liable had
the bank acted in a timely fashion.
Third, although prior court decisions have put forward methods which the debtor could
utilize to avoid double paying, these methods are “not… viable alternatives.” Id. at 888; see also
in re Dybalski, 316 B.R. 312, 317 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2004) (explaining methods the debtor could
use to avoid double paying). For example, the debtor could wait until all checks have cleared
before filing his bankruptcy petition. Id. Or, the debtor could use cashier checks if he expects
that he will soon be declaring bankruptcy. Id. The court rejected these alternatives because they
could result in a prolonged waiting period. The court also rejected these approaches because
lawyers may not be aware that these issues could arise and thus will not advise their clients to
follow these alternative methods. Minter-Higgins, 366 B.R. at 888.
Fourth, if debtors were required to double pay under these circumstances, it would
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actually have an even more detrimental effect on creditors. Requiring the debtor to pay twice will
“encourage persons in difficult financial circumstances not to pay debts . . . so that the amounts
of those debts paid by the use of negotiable instruments do not have to be repaid to the trustee
after the checks are cashed.” Id.
Seeking statutory support for it findings, the court relied on 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(11). The
court stated that this section “excepts the presentment of a negotiable instrument for payment
from the operation of the automatic stay” Id. at 886; thus the court says that although “[t]he post
petition final honoring of payment on a negotiable instrument ipso facto diminishes property of
the estate… that diminishment has been specifically authorized by Congressional enactment.” Id.

CONCLUSION
A Chapter 7 trustee cannot utilize a turnover motion to recover from a debtor postpetition transfers from the debtor’s bank account that resulted from pre-petition checks and debit
expenditures.
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